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CEPAL REVIEW No. 42 
The Mexican 
economy at 
the end of 
the century 
Miguel Sandoval Lara* 
Francisco Arroyo García** 
At the end of the 1940s, Raúl Prebisch, in Economic Survey 
of Latin America: 1949 (CEPAL, 1951), identified the main 
problems of Latin American economies on the basis of an 
analysis of their evolution during the first half of the 
century. The present study refers back to that analysis and 
compares its findings with contemporary development 
challenges and limitations. 
For nearly 40 years, Mexico, like other countries of 
the region, implemented a process of Import-substitute 
industrialization, with an important degree of government 
intervention and an active and increasing role for private 
enterprise. Until the end of the 1970s, this process benefited 
from the fact that the country did not depend on only one 
export product. With this growth model, Mexico did 
achieve a large number of the objectives established by 
its post-war development policy. Even so, some of the 
central problems pointed out by Prebisch were not solved 
satisfactorily, while other problems emerged which, under 
the pressure of the crisis of the early 1980s, have 
become considerable obstacles to development. 
Since 1983, a policy of macroeconomic correction, 
structural change, and foreign debt renegotiation has been 
in effect, as explained in this study. This policy has 
generated an economic and social modernization project 
that takes the transformed international environment into 
account and proposes new relations with it. 
* Economist in charge of Social Communication, 
National Bank for Public Works and Services, Mexico. 
Currently director of the periodicals Federalismo y 
desarrollo and Equipo. 
**Economist and currently editor of Federalismo y 
desarrollo, published by the National Bank for Public 
Works and Services, Mexico. 
Introduction 
The global economy is in the midst of an intense 
process of change that affects economic relations 
among nations, the directions of commercial and 
financial flows, and the production structures 
resulting from the technological advances of the last 
10 or 15 years. This set of transformations has led to 
changes in the dynamics and logic of post-war global 
economic growth and has consequently transformed 
development paradigms. This new situation calls 
into question the validity of conventional economic 
analyses as well as the efficacy of those economic 
policies that ignore the effects of interdependence 
among the still so-called "national economies". 
The end of the period of inward-looking 
development in Latin America led to a situation of 
crisis of diverse content and varying intensity in each 
country of the region within which different policies 
have emerged to face it. This cycle of aises now 
faces new international conditions which would seem 
to oblige Latin American countries to renew their 
relationship with the international economy. 
Mexico, having been one of the countries that 
pioneered debt renegotiation and because of its 
geographical position, seems more exposed than other 
countries of the region to global change. As the 1990s 
begin, government and diverse social sector efforts 
are centred on the search for ways to achieve 
economic recovery on the basis of a change in 
overseas relations, along with stabilization and 
internal corrective policies. 
"The 1950s and 1960s were a period of global expansion of 
production and trade, one of the most pronounced and lasting 
periods of prosperity in world history, with full employment and 
low inflation in the industrialized countries. This was a favourable 
environment for the developing nations, including those which 
gained their independence at that time . . . " 
In the context of economic theory, "disproportionate and 
almost exclusive importance was attached to the accumulation of 
physical capital. The Keynesian consensus reigned unopposed, and 
the neo-Keynesian development model, embodied in the 
Harrod-Domar formula, insisted on the accumulation of capital as 
the source of growth (the capital/output ratio, included in the 
denominator of the formula, was considered relatively constant)" 
(Singer, 1989, p. 603). 
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The view of Raul Prebisch and the mexican economy 
during the period of inward-looking growth2 
Prebisch began his analysis with an examination of 
the international post-war economic situation. As is 
known, Prebisch observed that the technical progress 
promoted by the countries that "created" capitalism 
had been the motor of their development. The 
consequences of the spread of that progress for Latin 
American economies could be seen in the way they 
came to be situated within the international division 
of labour: foreign demand for primary agricultural 
and mineral products was the determining factor for 
Latin American growth during that period. On this 
point, Prebisch noted: 
" . . . the economic development of the peripheral 
countries is one more stage in the world-wide spread 
of the new forms of productive technique or, if 
preferred, in the organic development of world 
economy... Latin America has, therefore, entered a 
new stage in the world-wide spread of technique, 
though technical methods are still far from having 
been assimilated completely in primary production, 
for.. . new productive methods tend to be adopted in 
activities connected in one way or another with the 
exportation of foodstuffs and raw materials rather 
than in other activities" (CEPAL, 1951, pp. 3 and 4). 
Prebisch postulated that the initial forms of Latin 
American articulation with the world economy 
marked its subsequent development and, on that 
basis, defined the principal obstacles and limitations 
that would impede a process of development similar 
to that of advanced countries.The definition of those 
restrictions, which Prebisch discovered in the 
evolution of the Mexican economy of that time, still 
shed light on the current Latin American development 
process. 
The first restriction has to do with the persistent 
scarcity of capital, i.e., the lack of capital of sufficient 
magnitude to allow for efficient use of the region's 
abundant human and natural resources and for 
financing the capitalization of the economy at the rate 
required by demographic growth.This chronic 
scarcity is explained by insufficient internal savings 
and low capitalization, arising in turn from the 
structure of imports and the transfer of resources 
overseas required by direct foreign investments. 
2
 The influence of Raúl Prebisch on Mexican development 
policy has been analysed En Sandoval and Arroyo, 1989. 
The second limitation arose from the tendency 
toward external imbalances, derived both from a lack 
of dynamism in exports which depend on demand in 
advanced countries and from the high coefficient of 
imports which grow as total income increases but 
which cannot be financed with further exports. This 
produces the region's chronic payment imbalance. 
The third factor is linked to the effects of 
technical progress on employment and its distribution 
across the spectrum of economic activities. Prebisch 
established that, in central countries, as technology 
spread from primary activities, displaced workers 
were absorbed into industrial and tertiary activities, a 
process that also allowed natural population growth to 
be absorbed into productive activity, thus eliminating 
problems of unemployment and sub-employment of 
those productive factors. 
Together with these restrictions, the fact that this 
process did not occur in Latin America impeded the 
achievement of production levels comparable to those 
of advanced economies. Prebisch argued that, 
according to prevalent economic theory, the solution 
to this problem lay in making the productive factors 
truly mobile: 
"It has already been seen that when technical 
progress is extended to primary production, it 
produces a surplus of gainfully employed population 
in that sector which can be absorbed by industry and 
other activities. If these other activities were not 
developed in the periphery, they would automatically 
have to develop in the centres which would 
consequently have to absorb the surplus manpower, in 
addition to that part of the natural increase in 
population which could not be absorbed in their own 
primary production. 
"This presupposes complete mobility of popula-
tion; in other words it would mean not only that the 
unemployable surplus of the population must be 
willing to emigrate from the periphery, overcoming a 
rooted unwillingness, but also that the countries of the 
centre must be prepared to admit large masses of 
immigrants who, accustomed to relatively low wages, 
would compete to advantage with the workers of the 
centre" (CEPAL, 1951, p. 13). 
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On this basis, in the chapter on Mexican 
economic development, Prebisch noted: 
"For some time now, Mexico's balance of 
payments had been subjected to severe strains 
emphasizing once again the fundamental 
incompatibility of growth and equilibrium within the 
free play obtaining in the economy of a country in 
full development... Such an examination reveals 
that in Mexico, as in other Latin American countries, 
the effort made to speed up economic development 
and raise the standard of living of the population has 
been curbed from the start by a limited capacity to 
import" (CEPAL, 1951, p. 391). 
It is worth recalling that, at that time, the 
Mexican economy achieved an average annual GDP 
growth rate of 6%, a rate that was maintained for 
nearly 20 years, although not without inflationary 
costs (an average of 9% annually) and monetary 
instability. In 1948-1949, it was necessary to 
devaluate the peso in order to absorb balance-of-
payments disequilibria (Solís, 1972). 
In his examination of 50 years of Mexican 
economic growth in this century, Prebisch 
underscored the decisive role played by the 
exportation of primary products -first petroleum and, 
later, industrial minerals- in order to finance the 
demands of capital. 
Prebisch noted the existence of a kind of conflict 
between vigorous growth and the restrictions 
affecting importation: 
"It is manifest that the country cannot maintain 
this rate of expansion and at the same time continue 
to import on such a large scale. Mexico is 
consequently confronted with a clear and conclusive 
choice of alternatives: either it must radically reduce 
the rate of development of its economy or else make a 
determined effort to modify the structure of its 
imports and adjust their coefficient in accordance 
with the rise in the national income, at the same time 
restricting foreign purchases to the limits set by the 
country's real capacity to pay for them" (CEPAL, 
1951, p. 391). 
Among the structural restrictions analysed, 
Prebisch underscored those relating to low levels of 
capitalization, due in part to the commercial deficit 
and the payment of incentives for foreign investment; 
the lack of infrastructure, especially railroads, which 
were nearly obsolete; and "precapitalist" farming, 
characterized by low productivity, excessive 
subdivision of the land with migration to the cities of 
great numbers of farm workers who could not all be 
absorbed into other economic activities. He also 
included as a structural limitation the impossibility of 
covering the need for capital goods to be used in 
modem farming and industry due to lack of resources. 
Prebisch proposed import substitution as a way to 
face these problems so that import capacity would be 
mainly used for capital goods and payment of foreign 
investment financial services, thus reducing 
disequilibrium pressures on the balance of payments. 
However, he also pointed out: 
"An intensive development of industrialization is 
of paramount urgency in order to relieve the pressure 
of population in the rural areas and provide, together 
with industry's related activities, new sources of 
employment for the natural increase of the urban 
population. The limited capacity to import is one of 
the greatest obstacles to industrial expansion. This 
capacity is determined primarily by exports and by 
the terms of trade, followed by foreign investments 
and receipts from tourism, the latter having been 
considerable in the past few years" (CEPAL, 1951, 
p. 397). 
In one of his last public statements, Raúl 
Prebisch raised a number of questions about possible 
changes in the world economic environment arising 
from the re-emergence of policies that favour market 
mechanisms for resource allocation. At the same 
time, with reference to foreign debt, he expressed 
concern over the attitude of governments and creditor 
banks in developed countries, as well as over the 
recommendations of the International Monetary Fund 
for correcting the economies of developing countries. 
It was foreseeable that, "given the inequality 
between centres and peripheries", Prebisch would not 
agree with the policy of opening the economy that, in 
his judgement, did not coincide with Latin American 
interests. He believed that the region could only form 
part of the world economy when it had acquired the 
economic and technological density necessary for 
participating in the unending creation of goods and 
services (Prebisch, 1987). His analysis was based on 
the observation that Latin America had only learned 
to export what he called "simple produce", demand 
for which grows slowly. 
To what extent is this approach valid today? 
Clearly, there are new factors that change the terms of 
reference, such as: the tertiarization of the 
international economy, especially that of the United 
States; the growing weight of South-East Asian 
countries that produce high technology goods 
efficiently; the impossibility of maintaining the old 
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protectionist system with its high levels of State 
intervention and impossibly large public sector 
deficits; and, lastly, the emergence of economic blocs 
or of countries linked by free-trade treaties. 
In the face of new pressures on developing 
countries to open up their economies to these new 
Mexican development achieved on the basis of import 
substitution has been widely analysed by many 
foreign and national specialists both in terms of 
success (for example, growth of the domestic product, 
employment, product diversification, and techno-
logical expansion) and problems unsatisfactorily 
resolved, such as sector integration, the incapacity of 
industrial activities to generate jobs at the rate 
demanded by the rapidly growing population, and the 
low competitive level of national industries. 
The crisis of the early 1980s and the subsequent 
period of adjustment, within the context of the search 
for viable economic policies, have called for the very 
rapid reconsideration of finance mechanisms for 
development, the degree of openness of the economy, 
and the regulatory role of the State and its 
participation in the production of goods and services. 
In 1983, as in nearly all of Latin America, 
Mexico began a corrective programme to reduce 
balance-of-payments disequilibria produced by the 
expanding transfer of funds overseas which, in 1982, 
had amounted to US$10.5 billion, equivalent to more 
than 6% of the domestic product. The programme 
consisted in measures designed to strengthen public 
finances, increase the primary surplus, contain 
monetary growth and credit, achieve an exchange rate 
coherent with domestic and foreign interest rates, and 
begin to open up the national commercial economy. 
In contrast to other efforts, this programme, 
together with orthodox measures, faced the need to 
combat the fundamental disequilibria of the Mexican 
economy through the implementation of the so-called 
structural change strategy (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 
1983) that consisted in measures designed to: redirect 
and modernize the production and distribution 
apparatus in order to create an industrial sector 
integrated internally and competitive internationally; 
increase domestic savings; rationalize public 
spending; decentralize productive activities and 
international trends, it is worth recalling that Prebisch 
noted that liberalization has very different meanings 
when used with respect to centres or peripheries, 
although it could also be said that this depends on the 
use of the term with respect to different areas of 
production or service. 
public administration throughout the country; and 
strengthen the role of the State in the promotion of 
development. 
It was thought that both kinds of measures could 
be implemented simultaneously but the conditions 
in which the strategy was created changed in a little 
less than two years, accentuating macroeconomic 
imbalances and thus forcing the authorities to 
intensify short-term corrections. 
Some conclusions with respect to the adjustment 
and its results in the 1983-1988 period3 are: 
- The adjustment period was longer than initially 
expected. At first, it was thought that a few measures 
to correct fiscal disequilibria, halt imports, promote 
overseas sales, and reduce inflation would be 
sufficient. When they proved to be insufficient, it was 
necessary to adopt more severe measures. 
- The adjustment was unavoidable. The situation 
up to 1983 could not, in fact, be sustained; the 
economic and social costs of the adjustment have 
been, to a certain degree, inevitable. 
- As long as in-depth measures to adjust the 
economy and correct the public deficit were not 
taken, attempts to stimulate growth (such as that of 
1985) were premature and could not be sustained. 
- The public deficit created by excessive 
spending became a public deficit arising from 
excessive interest payments on public domestic debt. 
This makes clear the need to distinguish between 
public operational accounts (considering only current 
account expenses) and financial accounts (taking into 
account interest on public debt). 
3
 For a detailed evaluation of the successes and limitations of 
the economic adjustment, see Alberro and Cambiazo, 1989 and 
Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1989. 
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- Foreign debt renegotiations also became 
progressively more sweeping. The Mexican 
renegotiations gradually convinced the international 
financial community and the United States 
Government of the necessity to change their 
perspective in order to admit creditor bank 
co-responsibility for the debt problem. 
- The Mexican stock market crisis of October 
1987 demonstrated, among other things, that the 
Mexican financial market is much more closely 
linked to overseas markets now than in the past, due 
either to the weight of expectations or to greater 
capital flow interdependence. 
- Since the end of 1987, government efforts were 
centred on reducing inflation. In December of that 
year, the first of a series of agreements, still in effect, 
was signed. That first agreement, called the Economic 
Solidarity Pact, combined orthodox and heterodox 
adjustment measures. 
- As the adjustment was deepened, new 
measures were taken to open up the economy further 
to foreign competition. Export permits were 
1. The new administration; accelerate 
the rate of change 
As the new decade begins, the Government of Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari is broadening the process of 
change. Domestically, the following steps are being 
taken: economic deregulation as a way to encourage 
private investment in key areas; consolidation of 
commercial openness in order to stimulate exports 
and increase productive efficiency; restructuring of 
the public sector, both in size and functions, in order 
to put government finances on a sound footing, 
improve public expense allocation, and increase 
social efficiency. Internationally, new types of 
relations with other countries are being sought in the 
context of establishing blocs or economic regions. 
After nearly seven years of economic stagnation, 
in 1989, the first year of the new administration, the 
Mexican economy is beginning to show other signs: 
the domestic product growth rate rose to 2.9%, a 
result that coincided with an important drop in the 
annual inflation rate, to 20%. Private investment 
registered a real increase of 8.3%, achieving the 
substituted more rapidly for tariffs and official import 
prices were gradually eliminated. Only areas such as 
the automotive, pharmaceutical, petroleum, and 
agricultural sectors remained subject to permits. 
- The greater openness of the economy achieved 
in 1988 played its part in controlling inflation. This is 
demonstrated by the greater inflation since then in 
non-tradeable goods, such as construction, education, 
and housing costs. 
In short, the post-war growth cycle, as 
experienced by the Latin American economy, has 
come to an end, as has the use of public spending to 
promote aggregate demand. It is now necessary to 
remove or resolve the disequilibria that block 
sustained and balanced development (Sunkel, 1989). 
At this point, the 1988-1994 period poses the 
challenge to consolidate the successes of the 
adjustment and to broaden those measures that will 
promote structural change, beyond those designed for 
short-term stabilization. This is precisely the 
objective of the modernization programme of the 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari Government. 
highest percentage of GDP in the last eight years, 
while private consumption rose 2.9% in real terms 
with respect to the previous year. Non-petroleum 
exports grew nearly 9% in comparison to 1988, a year 
in which they doubled 1985 figures, while the 
national accounts deficit was US$5.58 billion due to 
increased imports (12%) and the still high foreign 
debt service payments of US$9.4 billion (6% more 
than in 1988). 
In public finances, a primary economic surplus 
(excluding domestic debt interest) of 8.6% of GDP 
was obtained that allowed for a financial deficit drop 
of nearly 50% in real terms with respect to 1988 and 
7 percentage points less of GDP. 
In the international arena, the Government has 
allowed for the growing interdependence among 
national economies which can be observed in current 
commercial and financial trends, the impact of 
technology on productive processes, and the new 
character of transnational companies which tend to 
adapt their subsidiaries to the reality of each country. 
On the domestic scene, the problems diagnosed 
by Raúl Prebisch and many Mexican economists after 
III 
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him have again become central government concerns. 
They include underdevelopment in the farm sector, 
lack of basic infrastructure, the role of public 
companies, the general slump in the economy, and 
unequal income distribution (Poder Ejecutivo 
Federal, 1989, pp. 84-88). 
Along with these macroeconomic problems, 
there is an urgent need to meet the demands of a 
population that has undergone a rapid qualitative 
transformation in the last few years. All of this 
indicates new investment needs that require financing 
radically different from that which prevailed during 
the period of stabilizing development. For example, 
demographic projections indicate that the population 
will reach 94 million in the next five years and, 
toward the end of the century, around 110 million. 
There are also changes in the age structure: due to the 
extraordinary growth rates (on the order of 3% 
yearly) that prevailed until at least the mid-1970s, the 
younger population has gained greater relative 
weight, contributing yearly slightly more than 
850 000 persons to the work force. 
2. The modernization project's central propositions 
The modernization project had four basic lines of 
thrust: a) State reform to guarantee the success of the 
fundamental development objectives; b) economic 
policy coherent with the objective to make the most 
efficient use possible of natural and investment 
resources; c) greater openness to the new trends in the 
global economic environment; and d) active 
consensus-building with national groups, both those 
of the private sector and among those with lower 
incomes, including greater government presence in 
peripheral urban neighbourhoods. 
a) State reform 
The reform of the State includes, among other 
elements, the revision of its constitutional attributes 
with respect to some aspects of development and the 
review of its executive faculties for the purpose of 
both deregulating economic activities and reducing 
State intervention. The reform, therefore, seeks to 
introduce changes in the nature and structure of 
relations between the Government and the diverse 
sectors of society. In political terms, these changes 
imply the consolidation of democracy. 
Toward these ends, during 1989 and 1990, 
various decisions have already been taken. In terms of 
the privatization process, since 1989 to date, the 
Government has disposed of nearly 40 companies and 
enterprises as important as Teléfonos de México 
(TELMEX), Minera Cananea, and the iron and steel 
producing complex Las Truchas, among others, are 
being sold. 
In terms of deregulation, progress has been made 
in the areas of nation-wide truck and multimodal 
shipping, in packaging regulations, export promotion 
activities, technology transfer, and the petrochemical 
industry, as well as in the marketing of sugar, cocoa, 
and coffee. Customs laws have been changed; 
aquiculture has been integrated into the private sector; 
and the fishing products market has been deregulated 
to a degree. At the same time, regulations for the 
petroleum products industry have been modified and 
the use of telecommunications terminal equipment 
has been liberalized. The purpose of these measures is 
to eliminate privileges and such monopolies as had 
arisen from excessive regulation. 
On the other hand, the Presidential initiative of 2 
May, 1990, which reinstated the mixed property 
system for banks -nationalized in September 1982 at 
the height of the exchange and financial crisis- has 
reopened the way for private investment in 
commercial banking. This measure seeks to 
strengthen a climate of confidence and stability as it 
prepares the Mexican financial system for the new 
conditions of international openness. Later, in July of 
that year, Congress approved a new law regulating 
the Mexican banking industry that establishes the 
conditions and foundations for the financial system 
within the new economic conditions. 
b) Changes in economic policy 
The economic strategy has two main goals: to 
recover an economic growth rate of around 6% by 
1994 and to consolidate economic stability by seeking 
to reduce inflation to rates compatible with those of 
the country's main commercial partners. 
To reach these goals, the 1989-1994 devel-
opment plan has been designed according to two 
central guidelines: the progressive stabilization of the 
economy and increased availability of resources for 
investment in production. 
The progressive stabilization of the economy 
involves increasing public revenues, limiting public 
spending in accordance with the availability of 
non-inflationary financing, promoting price stability, 
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strengthening domestic savings, and supporting prices 
through exchange-rate policy (Poder Ejecutivo 
Federal, 1989, pp. 57-63). 
For these purposes, a firm fiscal reform was 
implemented that modified the tax base and 
eliminated special tax havens that had become 
unjustified "fiscal paradises". Moreover, the overall 
subsidy system is being revised and public goods 
and services tariffs and prices have been modified in 
order to bring them gradually up to their real market 
prices. 
Within the financial system, competition among 
banks has been promoted by permitting the free 
determination of rates and time periods, eliminating 
excessive regulation, and diversifying deposit 
instruments. Development banking remains in the 
hands of the State, although its functions have been 
redirected toward banking services of secondary 
importance. Moreover, efforts are being made to 
strengthen the capital market so that it will be more 
flexible in response to the needs of growth financing 
and will be competitive internationally in the 
acquisition of foreign capital. 
Increased resource availability for investment in 
production (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1989, pp. 
63-69) involves strengthening both public and private 
savings and reducing the transfer of resources 
overseas, a task within which an important role is 
played by the foreign debt renegotiation agreement 
between Mexico and creditor banks, international 
organizations, and the Club of Paris, an agreement 
that crowned an intense process of 14 months of 
proposal analysis and negotiations. In it, the net 
principal owed was reduced by around US$21 billion, 
a reduction in annual resource transfer of an average 
of US$4 billion, and a change in the expiration date 
profile to a horizon of 30 years when a single 
payment of US$35 billion will be made. In this way, 
during the 1989-1994 period, transfers of funds 
overseas will represent an average of 2% of the 
domestic product in contrast with the 6% level of the 
1980s. 
A detailed évaluation of lhe renegotiation process and its 
impact on the Mexican economy is found in Ministry of Finance 
and Public Credit, 1990. 
c) Efficient integration into the new international 
arena 
According to the plan (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 
1989, pp. 84-88), the foreign trade policy objectives 
are: to promote non-petroleum exports; to achieve 
greater uniformity in the effective protection of 
diverse industries; to lessen the distortions arising 
from non-tariff restrictions on commerce; increase 
exports and orient foreign investment, technology 
transfer and use of foreign resources towards the 
achievement of national commerce policy goals. 
With respect to direct foreign investment, 
procedures for the authorization of new investments 
have been simplified thanks to new regulations in the 
respective law. 
d) Consensus-building: the change in the relationship 
between government and society 
The idea of consensus-building among diverse 
social groups is to promote an attitude of shared 
responsibility for development throughout society. 
According to this new concept, the Government now 
fulfills the institutional function of creating conditions 
in which society can achieve its objectives. 
It is worth recalling here that President Carlos 
Salinas himself has stated that, in this sense, Mexico's 
problem has not been that of a small weak State but 
rather that of a State which, as it grew ever larger, 
became weak. Problems were exacerbated as the 
State grew in disproportionate and disorderly fashion, 
concentrating its efforts oñ the search for resources to 
maintain its own size in detriment to public service 
and the improvement of its capacity to defend the 
nation. The reform that will make the State flexible 
and efficient requires freeing resources that today are 
locked into public companies and concentrating 
political attention on the urgent demands of justice 
(Salinas de Gortari, 1990). 
With this orientation, public efforts have 
concentrated on building consensus in three 
directions: a) to stabilize the economy through social 
pacts; b) to promote new finance systems for key 
economic areas such as highway infrastructure, 
mines, basic petrochemical services, and cellular 
telephones; and c) to overcome extreme poverty 
through the National Solidarity Programme which 
operates with its own budget and functions in a 
decentralized fashion in conjunction with municipal 
governments and community organizations. In 1990, 
resources dedicated to this programme amounted to 
3.5 trillion pesos, that is, around US$1.2 billion. 
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IV 
Terms of reference for renewed integration into 
the world economy 
On the threshold of the twenty-first century, as in the 
1950s, the foreign sector constitutes a crucial element 
in the development of the Mexican economy. There 
are, nevertheless, differences between these two 
periods that basically lie both in the new dynamics of 
international economics and in the type of industrial 
installation that characterizes the country's economy 
after four decades of inward growth. 
The transition process begun by Mexico in its 
relations with the rest of the world, i.e., the effort to 
eliminate the traditional anti-export bias of the 
productive sector and open up a market that has been 
captive for nearly half a century, while overseas sales 
are converted into a motor for growth is made more 
complex and delicate by the fact that global 
transformations are occurring simultaneously with 
internal stabilization efforts and structural changes. 
The new direction for growth implies significant 
changes in resource allocation, both at the level of 
businesses and in the definition of the role of the State 
and of the kind of economic policy to be applied in 
the coming years. 
In this context, the decision to establish a free 
trade agreement with the United States, a topic only 
recently being discussed, focuses on a complex set of 
problems, in particular the need to overcome 
economic stagnation and redefine the role of the State 
in the transition. 
1. Recent developments in the Mexican 
foreign trade sector 
In a little less than 15 years, Mexican foreign 
economic relations have undergone fundamental 
changes that have, in turn, affected the country's 
growth, conditioning its direction and rhythm to an 
important degree. In this section, the transformation 
undergone by the foreign sector of the Mexican 
economy will be analysed in the light of the most 
significant changes in the structure of foreign 
commerce, the foreign debt and its service, the 
inbond assembly industries (maquiladoras) and their 
influence, the composition of direct foreign 
investment, and the characteristic traits of integration 
occurring between Mexico and the United States. 
a) Changes in the structure of foreign commerce 
During the entire post-war period before the 
marked expansion of petroleum sales, there was a 
balance-of-payments deficit in the national accounts 
that was covered by agricultural and mineral sales, 
manufacturing (for a relatively modest amount), 
tourism income, and finally by foreign loans. During 
this period, the domestic market was protected by a 
system of high tariffs and the rigid and discretionary 
management of import permits, together with fixed 
exchange parity. At the end of 1976, it was necessary 
to devalue the peso in order to correct balance-of-
payments disequilibria. 
Since 1978, due to the oil boom, the structure of 
foreign commerce changed drastically: between 1978 
and 1982, oil sales rose to account for an average of 
45% of trade account income, while agricultural and 
tourism sales accounted for a lower percentage of 
total income, although their total value remained 
more or less constant. The new availability of 
resources and false expectations caused imports to 
grow threefold between 1977 and 1981. Moreover, 
the structure of imports also changed: capital goods 
imports rose from 26% of total imports in 1977 to 
31% in 1982, while consumer goods imports rose 
rapidly from 8.8% in 1977 to 13% in 1980, dropping 
off to 10% in 1982. This behaviour was the 
consequence of the rate of growth of the domestic 
product which reached an annual average of 8% 
during the years prior to the crisis. 
As a result of the implementation of the 
adjustment programme, in 1983 imports dropped by 
around 40% with respect to their 1982 level and 65% 
with respect to 1981 as part of the adjustment of 
domestic demand designed to stabilize the economy 
and counteract the effects of the drop in oil prices. 
The moment was seized to introduce structural 
changes in this important variable in Mexican 
development through a gradual rationalization of 
trade policy that was linked to transformations of 
industrial infrastructure designed to make it more 
competitive internationally and to enable it to serve as 
a source of income. Between 1983 and 1985, oil sales 
continued to represent an average of 50% of total 
income, a contribution that was used to cover 
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debt-service and payments on the short-term principal 
and to maintain high-priority imports. At the end of 
1985, other events, such as the hike in real 
international interest rates, a new drop in oil prices, 
and the effects of the earthquake in Mexico City in 
September of that year, led to a radical change in the 
dynamics of the openness of the Mexican economy. 
In this situation, the reduction of the number of 
tariff segments subject to control, of the range of tax 
rates, and of the average import tariff initiated the 
dismantling of domestic market protectionism. Added 
to this, in July 1986, the decision was taken to enter 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
for the purpose of consolidating multilateral trade 
relations. This resolution modified an earlier (1979) 
decision not to enter that organism, when the outlook 
abroad was completely different. 
In 1990, Mexican foreign commerce presents a 
radically different image from that of a decade ago: 
80% of tariff segments are no longer subject to 
permits; tax rates have been integrated into five 
levels, in contrast with the 20 levels of 1983; the 
average tariff is 9.5%, as opposed to 16.4% in 1982. 
The structure of merchandise exports also 
registered substantial changes: between 1982 and 
1989 non-petroleum exports grew at the annual 
average rate of 20%, rising from US$4 753 million to 
US$14 889 million. These sales accounted for 65% of 
commercial income in 1989, as opposed to the 22% 
they represented in 1982. Exports of manufactured 
goods accounted for 60% of the total in this area, 
within which the automotive, food-processing, 
chemical and mineral-processing sectors are the most 
dynamic, accounting for 35% of overseas 
manufactured goods sales in 1989. 
During a first stage, from 1985 to 1987, growth 
of manufactured goods exports occurred within a 
stagnant economy in which the manufacturing GDP 
did not grow (Gitli, 1990, pp. 16-20 and 45), although 
there was a considerable rise in imports of 
intermediate goods which, by 1986, accounted for 
65% of total imports. This implies that the 
implementation of a model oriented toward exports 
calls immediately for greater integration into the 
international economy. 
b) The inbond assembly industry 
The United States inbond assembly plants were 
installed in Mexico in the 1970s, a time during which 
the industrialization of the Mexican border was being 
promoted in order to exploit, on the one hand, the 
advantages arising from proximity to the market in 
the United States and, on the other, as a means of 
retaining within Mexico the population from the 
centre and south of the country that emigrated in 
search of higher income and better work conditions. 
Until the end of the 1970s, the level of employment 
and the number of plants was relatively low: each 
plant occupied an average of 165 workers. Beginning 
in the 1980s, exploiting the additional advantages 
arising from devaluations and the cost of Mexican 
labour, a considerable increase took place: around 
1985, 620 plants occupied 124 000 workers, i.e., five 
times as many as in 1970. 
Beginning in 1985, these industries acquired a 
new impetus. Since then, they have been diversified 
and have grown all along the border with the United 
States. Bureaucratic procedures were eliminated in 
order to facilitate temporary imports (i.e., those 
necessary for the subsequent exportation of finished 
products) and to encourage greater use of national 
inputs. Between 1985 and 1988, 870 plants were 
installed, employing 232 000 workers and, in 1989, 
another 310, bringing the number of businesses to 
1 700, which carried out total commercial operations 
of approximately US$12 billion and gave work to 
slightly more than 450 000 workers and office staff 
(an average of 265 persons per plant), a figure 
equivalent to 17% of Mexican manufacturing 
industry employment. 
A number of analysts have characterized this 
process as an example of the complementarity and 
integration being achieved by the manufacturing 
industries of these two countries. 
c) Direct foreign investment 
It is interesting to note that, in spite of Mexico's 
economic problems both before and during the crisis, 
direct foreign investment (DFI) continued, although 
at lower rates of growth. For example, cumulative 
direct investment up to 1989 amounted to US$26 
billion, five times the accumulated investment in 
1975 and two and a half that of 1982, representing, 
however, a small percentage of GDP: scarcely 2%. 
The following is its distribution pattern: 67% in 
industry; 25% in services; 7% in commerce and less 
than 2% in extractive activities and others, s for 
origin, 63% came from the United States, 6.7% from 
Great Britain, 6.3% from West Germany, 5% from 
Japan, 4.5% from Switzerland, and the rest from other 
countries. 
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The traditional protectionist policies of 
stabilizing development, particularly rigid legislation 
on investments controlled by foreign majorities, and 
the option taken prior to the crisis of using foreign 
debt to cover the financial needs of the economy 
instead of foreign investment, all contributed to the 
relatively low weight of DF1. 
At the present time, the idea that it is better to 
have partners than creditors is gaining ground. This 
has become even more evident after it became 
necessary to resort to reconversion or exchange of 
foreign debt for investment, a mechanism that, 
although it involves reducing the size of the debt, 
implies exaggerated subsidies for foreign investments 
which probably would have been made without that 
procedure. Moreover, the mechanism has inflationary 
consequences that are particularly delicate at a time 
when a reduced rate of price hikes is a central 
economic policy objective. 
d) Foreign debt 
The explanation of the behaviour of the foreign 
debt bes in the decision to give artificial life to the old 
system of development that prevailed in the country 
since the beginning of the 1970s, a time when there 
were abundant resources in the international markets, 
available at negative real interest rates that made debt 
attractive. Public foreign debt grew 4.5 times between 
1970 and 1976, rising from US$4.3 billion to 
US$19.6 billion. Moreover, interest payments 
amounted to 10% of total balance-of-payment outlays 
at that time, rising to nearly 14% in 1975 and 1976. 
From 1977 onwards, the expectations created by 
the oil boom led to intensified debt accumulation: by 
1982, the debt had grown to three times its 1976 
volume, rising from US$19.6 billion to US$59 
billion. Furthermore, from 1977, there was a 
substantial difference from earlier debt: service 
payments amounted to nearly a quarter of commercial 
balance spending, 21.6%, with a tendency to rise that 
moved from 18.3% in 1977 to 35.7% in 1982. 
In spite of good intentions, the governments from 
1972 to 1982 led the Mexican economy into domestic 
financial disorder, with a weakened currency, 
unrestrained inflation, and practically unmanageable 
foreign debt. Furthermore, at the end of the 1970s 
and beginning of the 1980s, the economy once again 
faced its old problem: the deterioration of the terms of 
export exchange, aggravated by rising international 
interest rates. 
During the period of macroeconomic adjustment 
after 1983, the international banks stopped the flow of 
foreign resources while the debt was being 
renegotiated. Even so, after various renegotiations, 
debt service was maintained together with a certain 
level of basic goods importation. 
While the foreign debt of private companies was 
managed adequately with government assistance 
(through the system called Foreign Exchange Risk 
Coverage Trust Fund (FICORCA)), public debt 
continued to grow, although at a lower rate than in 
previous years: between 1983 and 1988, it rose from 
US$62.5 billion to US$94 billion. This amounted to 
an increase of 51%, with debt service accounting for 
34% of total outlays during the period, a percentage 
equivalent to slightly more than US$10 billion per 
year or, in other terms, 6% of GDP. That level of 
transfer was a drain on the country's economic 
growth. 
2. The free trade agreement and greater 
interdependence with the United States economy 
The last quarter of the twentieth century has been 
characterized by abrupt change. The growing weight 
of Japan and other Asian countries, the new 
consciousness with respect to energy resources, the 
debt crisis, the tendency among countries to form 
trading blocs, technological changes, the failure of the 
centrally-planned economies and of Keynesianism in 
the rest of the world, among other phenomena, 
require new responses from Latin American 
economies. 
Overcoming the crisis and advancing in 
macroeconomic adjustments, the Mexican economy 
has moved ahead in the search for new ways to 
recover a process of sustained development and 
general welfare. On examining the consequences of 
renewed insertion of the Mexican economy into the 
world economy and, more specifically in connection 
with the United States economy, it is useful, in 
general, to consider two factors. 
Above all, it is necessary to take into account the 
important differences in the levels of development 
that exist between Mexico and the United States and, 
by the same token, in the levels of welfare and 
salaries. This explains the strong flow of emigrants 
toward that country. Independently of decisions taken 
in matters of a new commercial relationship, 
migratory pressure will continue.5 
The flow of illegal migrants varies, according to different 
estimates, between 500 000 and one million persons annually. 
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Secondly, both economies are tending toward 
greater interdependence, a fact that can be 
demonstrated in different ways: for example, 70% of 
Mexico's foreign commerce is with the United States. 
In 1989, this amounted to US$52 billion, that is, 
double the amount of 1982.6 Furthermore, 60% of 
domestic debt is in the hands of United States banks, 
while 65% of foreign investment comes from that 
country. 
Many analysts speak of a "silent integration" 
between the two countries: the literature on the 
diverse aspects of this reality is ample and is being 
produced, nearly daily, by different centres and 
government sources, by the private and academic 
sectors. It is not possible here to discuss all the stages 
and aspects of this process. Whether one is for or 
against, it is a phenomenon that cannot be ignored, 
one that is evolving at a fairly rapid pace, as well.7 
From the Mexican point of view, the proposal for 
a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States 
arises from the conditions generated by the most 
recent national economic developments, that is, once 
the first stage of macroeconomic stabilization was 
over. As the first liberalization measures were 
adopted, after 1985, it became clear that export sales 
were limited by diverse types of United States 
protectionism. It soon became evident, as well, that 
the same problem was being resolved further to the 
north, through the Free Trade Agreement between the 
United States and Canada that has been in effect since 
January, 1989. It can be concluded that, if it is true 
that import substitution was more a historical 
necessity than a deliberate policy choice, as Aldo 
Ferrer has noted, the same is true now for the 
openness of the Mexican economy. 
On the United States side, the FTA is favoured 
by government and private groups concerned with 
recovering global economic leadership for the United 
States and with stabilizing economic relations and 
migratory flows with their neighbour to the south. 
The United States, or at least important circles within 
that country, are reacting in the same way to the 
formation of the European bloc and to the new role 
being assumed by the nations of South-East Asia. 
This is still far less than the volume of commerce between 
(he United States and Canada, which, in 1989, was nearly 
US$220 000 million. 
7
 To illustrate (he growing importance of the Mexican 
presence in the southern United States, it is sufficient to mention 
that 60% of the Hispanic population, around 20 million persons, is 
estimated to be Mexican. 
In a first approximation, this would seem to 
explain the so-called Initiative for the Americas of the 
United States Government, a proposal which 
apparently calls for a new framework of relations 
with all of Latin America, based on three main lines 
of thrust: trade, investment and debt.8 The 
characteristics and ramifications of this proposal will 
be the subject of far-reaching debate, the duration and 
conclusions of which are difficult to foresee. 
a) The background of the free trade agreement 
between the United States and Mexico 
Economic relations between Mexico and the 
United States have unfolded within a complex 
process of negotiations which have occasionally been 
affected by non-economic factors, advancing through 
situations, at times, of conflict and, at times, of 
mutual understanding. In terms of commerce, actions 
taken prior to the proposed free trade treaty have their 
roots in the 1970s, when the United States imposed 
the Generalized System of Preference (GATT) in 
1974, as part of the protectionist reaction that 
followed on the 1973 oil shock. With this system, the 
United States could control exports from developing 
countries by imposing quotas and demanding 
compliance with discretionary regulations and other 
para-tariff measures. 
The growth of Mexican foreign trade was thus 
subjected to those determinations. Since then, it has 
been necessary to proceed within a framework of 
negotiations limited to those specific areas in which 
Mexico is relatively competitive. 
In 1975, both countries signed a textile 
agreement -renewed, since then, on five occasions-
under which Mexico gains access to the United States 
market, even though restrictions remain for certain 
products which pose risks for the United States textile 
industry. The last renewal took place in January 1988, 
and remains in effect until December 1991. 
In 1984, an agreement was signed to establish 
steel export quotas within the context of the 
Voluntary Restriction Accords which protect the 
United States market. Under this agreement, Mexican 
exports could amount to between 0.31% and 0.46% 
of the apparent national consumption in the United 
States. This agreement was renewed in October, 
1989, for a period of 30 months, with a quota of 
0.95% for the first 15 months and 1.1% for the 
remaining 15 months. 
8
 See George Bush's speech, "initiative for the Americas", 
Washington, D.C., 27 June 1990, published in El Nacional, Mexico 
City, June 1990, pp. 8 and 10. 
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In 1985, a bilateral understanding was reached on 
the matters of subsidies and compensatory rights for 
the purpose of reducing frictions arising from the 
unproven claim put forward by some United States 
merchants that Mexican exports were being 
subsidized. This accord was renewed for a further 
three years, beginning in 1988. 
By 1987, the negotiations under, way within the 
general agreement or bilateral understanding about 
consultation on matters of trade or investment 
covered a range of industries and areas of mutual 
interest (steel, electronics, textiles, agriculture, tariffs, 
foreign investment, intellectual property, insurance, 
and transportation). In March 1989, this agreement 
was ratified and study groups were formed for each 
area. 
In October 1989, both countries signed a new 
framework agreement designed to incorporate other 
areas, given the prevalent interest in promoting trade 
and investment in those areas within the overall 
negotiations. The new agreement refers to areas such 
as the petrochemical industry, a group of farm 
products, and loan regulations and standards. 
On the basis of these agreements, in October 
1989, a joint committee for the promotion of 
investment and trade was formed for the purpose of 
stimulating investment and exports in the 
agreed-upon areas, within a general framework that 
supersedes negotiation by sector or in terms of 
diverse products and allows for greater inter-
dependence between the two economies. In a first 
stage, this committee will promote investment 
projects in the petrochemical, telecommunications, 
textile, electronics and food-processing industries. 
b) The basic contents of the free trade agreement 
In June 1990, both Governments initiated 
conversations aimed at establishing a free trade treaty 
which will cover the following points: 
- Promotion of investment and goods and 
services trade through the gradual elimination of 
tariffs; 
- Elimination or maximum reduction of all 
possible non-tariff barriers, such as quotas, import 
permits and technical barriers to commerce; 
- Creation of effective mechanisms for the 
protection of intellectual property, patents, trade-
marks and trade secrets; 
- Implementation of efficient mechanisms for 
the resolution of controversies. 
Both countries have already initiated the 
formalities mandated by their respective legislatures. 
Even so, several months will pass before detailed 
negotiations will begin. Although the agreement set 
for December 1900, between Canada and the United 
States required several years of negotiations and 
studies, the agreement with Mexico is being advanced 
through more expeditious channels on the initiative of 
both Governments. 
c) Some terms of reference 
On examining the possible motivations and 
determinant conditions for a free trade agreement 
with the United States, the following terms of 
reference seem to emerge with respect to the new 
insertion of Mexico into the global economy: 
- The need to give order and direction to the 
process of growing interdependence between the two 
economies. For example, inbond assembly activities 
and migration have grown in an uncontrolled fashion, 
principally in the border areas of both countries and 
in certain industries (such as the automotive, 
electronics, textile, furniture, and the electric and 
electronic supplies industries) and not, as yet, within 
the emerging joint framework for both economics. 
The agreement would allow for amplifying the effects 
in the production infrastructure of both economies, as 
well as in other regions of their territories. 
- The need for bilateral regulation of those 
economic matters which are currently managed in 
discretional fashion. That is, more even-handed 
negotiations are necessary, not only between 
governments, but among business people. 
- The need to obtain fresh capital to finance 
Mexican development, both for increasing industrial 
capacity and modernizing economic infrastructure. 
- The need to make the Mexican economy more 
competitive and efficient as a way of gaining more 
space in world markets, not only in the United States. 
In this sense, the basic aim seems to be that of 
changing relations with the global economy on the 
basis of a new relationship with that of the United 
States. 
- The need to create jobs and respond more 
rapidly to those social demands made more acute by 
nearly seven years of economic stagnation. This will 
become a means of both slowing emigration and of 
generating new income for the Mexican people. The 
position of the Mexican Government has been: "We 
wish to export merchandise, not workers". 
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The advantages and risks involved in a project of 
such a nature and dimensions depend on many 
economic and non-economic factors. Among the 
advantages would seem to be the current 
characteristics and structural restrictions of the 
country's productive capacity, limitations that are not 
altogether different from those observed by Raúl 
Prebisch a long time ago but which, today, are in a 
process of profound change. 
A relatively short-term effect could be the influx 
of capital in the form of financial investment, which 
would enter into play with a banking system in the 
process of being re-privatized and a stock market in a 
process of revitalization. In a second stage, mid-term 
production projects to take advantage of the new rules 
of the game should be generated.In this way, a 
broader market for the products of both countries 
would gradually take shape. 
Another positive effect has to do with the 
creation of a new, more propitious economic 
environment which would allow for more secure and 
longer-range investment planning; this would entail 
overcoming the current situation of sectoral and 
product-specific negotiations. Matters, such as greater 
technological transfer, improved business 
management systems, and new possibilities for joint 
ventures by businesses of both countries, would be 
covered. 
At the same time, United States products could 
become more competitive thanks to the low cost of 
Mexican labour. The transfer of businesses to Mexico 
would allow United States manufacturers to supply 
products both for the local and international markets 
with an advantage over other countries. 
Within these negotiations, it is foreseeable that 
the United States Government will exert pressure for 
the liberalization of services, especially financial 
services (currently limited to citizens by the law for 
credit institutions, recently modified in July 1990), 
and for greater flexibility in foreign investment 
regulations for the purpose of ensuring a stable capital 
market for United States private investors. This would 
give that country an advantage in the negotiations of 
these matters within the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in the Uruguay Round. A 
topic requiring special care will be negotiations with 
respect to Mexican energy resources, given the 
foreseeable interest of the United States in ensuring 
access to alternative energy sources and the 
reluctance of the Mexican Government to include that 
matter in the agreement. 
Within the conversations, mention has been 
made of the objective to duplicate the volume of trade 
between the two countries, in order to reach US$100 
billion in five or six years, depending on when the 
agreement enters into effect. This would imply 
average annual growth of 15% which, judging from 
the trade growth rates of recent years (around 20% 
annually), does not seem impossible. 
Moreover, given the different interests of the 
United States and Japan in commercial matters, 
Mexico could become an investment alternative for 
Japanese merchants who would be seeking to 
consolidate their position within the United States 
market, although this possibility could be expressly 
rejected by the United States Government in the 
negotiations. Japanese investors seem to be waiting 
for Mexican business access to the United States 
market before embarking on investment projects in 
Mexico, together with the satisfaction of their 
demands for reform of Mexican law in order to 
protect investments from Japan. 
With respect to the range of interests within each 
country, both favourable and opposing positions can 
be observed. Part of United States society is 
concerned about the intensification of migratory 
flows of workers into their country and will 
energetically oppose the legalization of labour 
mobility. Certain United States labour union groups 
have expressed fears in the face of the foreseeable 
displacement of workers which the emigration to 
Mexico of capital directed principally towards 
labour-intensive endeavours would occasion. In this 
context, it is worth while to mention Rudiger 
Dombusch, who reminded United States public 
opinion that competition among low-salary countries 
has been occurring for some time and that the 
tendency of United States businesses has been to 
produce in other countries, mainly in Asia, and 
subsequently increase the flow of exports to the 
United States. Within the context of a free-trade 
treaty with Mexico, he observes that we should ask 
ourselves, as jobs move abroad, whether we prefer 
them moving south or to Asia. 
For its part, in Mexico, opposition politicians, 
certain union representatives, and small business 
people have also raised criticisms of the agreement. 
See the series of articles "Commercial Relations: the United 
States-Mexico", EINacional, Mexico City, 25-28 June 1990. 
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d) What will the future bring? 
Above all, it is necessary to recognize that 
we are witnessing a long-term process: the fruits of 
the FTA will not be seen immediately, nor have the 
effects of greater economic openness since 1985 
come to light rapidly. Since then, major changes 
have taken place in the country's export base: 
non-petroleum exports grew, between 1982 and 1989, 
at a rate of 20% annually, rising from US$4 753 
million to US$14 889 million. Manufacturing exports 
now account for 60% of non-petroleum sales and 
acted as a motor for the rest of the economy during 
1989 and part of 1990. 
On the whole, it will be necessary to moderate 
the urge to concentrate overseas sales only in 
businesses with foreign participation and to exert 
influence on all productive areas within the country 
so that the new development will be not only 
sustained but will also maintain certain social, 
sectoral, and regional balances. 
To date, economic openness has had more 
benefits than costs, mainly for two reasons: the depth 
of the crisis of the 1980s which undermined the 
foundations of the style of growth of the past and the 
new international conditions which independently 
This study has covered a wide range of topics for 
the purpose of presenting a profile of the situation of 
the Mexican economy at the end of a difficult phase 
in terms of its limits and potentialities in the new 
circumstances. Surely, the evolution among countries 
Alberro, José and Jorge Cambiazo (1989), "El ajuste de la 
economía mexicana, 1983-1986", El Economista 
Mexicano, vol. XX, No. 4/5, Mexico City, Colegio 
Nacional de Economistas, A.C. 
Bank of Mexico (1990), Indicadores económicos, Mexico 
City, Dirección de Investigación Económica, March. 
(1990), Informe anual 1989, Mexico City. 
Casar P., José I. (1989), Transformación en el patrón de 
especialización y comercio exterior del sector 
manufacturero mexicano 1978-1987, Mexico City, 
exerted pressure in favour of a different direction for 
growth. 
Nevertheless, it will be necessary to be alert to 
costs which will appear as the process of commercial 
integration advances. It is also possible that juridical 
controversies will arise which will be difficult to 
resolve, given the possibilities and advantageousness 
of change in certain Mexican laws. 
In very general terms, several economic policy 
recommendations can be derived from this 
discussion: 
- Support certain industrial areas during the 
transition; 
- Provide financial support for the commercial 
disequilibria occasioned by increased imports, 
principally of intermediate goods; 
- Define policies and specific support 
mechanisms for agriculture, rural employment, and 
food processing activities; and 
- Implement emergency measures to provide 
jobs for those workers who will be displaced during 
the transition. 
In any case, there must be no doubt about the 
necessity of entering into a new relationship with the 
global economy in the greater interests of long-term 
Mexican development. 
and regions will be very different in the immediate 
future than during the post-war period. In this context, 
the path that Mexico is beginning to travel can only 
be dimly discerned. 
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